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THE SINGAPORE CHILL:
POLITICAL DEFAMATION AND THE NORMALIZATION
OF A STATIST RULE OF LAW
Cameron Sim†
Abstract: Recent cases involving opposition politicians and foreign publications,
in which allegations of corruption leveled against both the executive and the judiciary
were found to be defamatory and in contempt of court, struck at the heart of Singapore’s
ideological platform as a corruption-free meritocracy with an independent judiciary. This
article examines the implications of these cases for the relationship between the courts,
the government, and the rule of law in Singapore. It is argued that judicial normalization
of the government’s politics of communitarian legalism has created a statist and
procedural rule of law that encourages defamation laws to chill political opposition. The
dual state construct in Singapore, under which commercial law remains depoliticized and
readily enforceable, has been distorted, which creates uncertainty across all areas of
Singapore’s common law and thereby undermines the government’s economic agenda.

I.

INTRODUCTION

A key concept in the ideological framework of Singapore’s governing
People’s Action Party (“PAP”) is providing certainty and security for
Singapore’s economy through the centrality of a platform of anticorruption.1 Part of the emphasis on international investment and economic
development in Singapore is premised on the basis that Singapore is
corruption-free.2 Preventative legislation,3 departments such as the Corrupt
Practices Investigation Bureau, and high salaries paid to public servants,4 all
serve to strengthen this anti-corruption platform. Singapore consistently
ranks highly in international corruption standings.5 When the integrity of the
government is brought into question, it is not uncommon for Singapore’s
†
BA, LLB (Hons) (Melb); Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Victoria; Solicitor and Barrister of the
High Court of Australia. I would like to thank the anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions. I would
also like to thank the members of the journal, in particular Wyatt Golding and Amber Penn-Roco, for their
efforts in the editorial process.
1
LEE KUAN YEW, FROM THIRD WORLD TO FIRST, THE SINGAPORE STORY: 1965-2000 157 (2000).
2
See Li-Ann Thio, Rule of Law within a Non-Liberal “Communitarian” Democracy: The
Singapore Experience, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW: THEORIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE
OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE AND THE U.S. 183, 192-3 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004).
3
See, e.g., Prevention of Corruption Act, ch. 241 (1960) (Sing.).
4
High salaries paid to public servants are allegedly seen by the government as affirming an ancient
Confucian precept to pay good people to encourage them to work for the government. See Goh Chok
Tong, Senior Minister of the Republic of Singapore, Speech at the 2000 National Day Rally (Aug. 9, 2000),
in STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), Aug. 21, 2000, at 35.
5
In 2010, Singapore was ranked first in the World Competitive Yearbook. See INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT, WORLD COMPETITIVE YEARBOOK 1 (2010),
http://www.imd.ch/research/publications/wcy/upload/scoreboard.pdf.
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government to protect this image through the courts by launching
defamation suits as a mechanism to deny these allegations. The trend of the
past four decades in this area of the law is striking in its consistency: neither
former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew nor current Prime Minister Lee Hsien
Loong have ever lost a defamation action.6 Singapore’s Court of Appeal has
even stated that Lee Kuan Yew “is almost universally acknowledged as the
architect of Singapore’s corruption-free government,”7 and it is within
Singapore’s courts that Lee Kuan Yew’s reputation has always been
successfully defended.
The government of Singapore perceives that there is a campaign being
waged against Singapore’s courts, which seeks to cast doubt on the integrity
and independence of the judiciary.8 The judiciary has made clear that it will
not tolerate any attempts to undermine public confidence in the courts “by
making false and scandalous allegations.”9 In July 2005, a scandal erupted
in Singapore over the handling of the National Kidney Foundation’s
(“NKF”) funds (commonly referred to as the “NKF scandal”). The judiciary
has since said that to link an institution with the NKF scandal is to “sully
their standing and integrity,”10 and that NKF has become a “byword for
corruption, financial impropriety and the knowing abuse of unmeritorious
defamation suits.”11 Such an association would be patently at odds with the
government’s ideological, corruption-free framework. In two recent sets of

6
See, e.g., Harbans Singh Sidha v. Pub. Prosecutor, 1 Malayan L. J. 41 (1973); Lee Kuan Yew v.
J.B. Jeyaretnam, 1 Malayan L. J. 281 (1979); J.B. Jeyaretnam v. Lee Kuan Yew, 1 Malayan L. J. 239
(1982); J.B. Jeyaretnam v. Lee Kuan Yew, 1 Malayan L. J. 97 (1984); Lee Kuan Yew v. Scow Khee Leng,
1 Malayan L. J. 11 (1986); Lee Kuan Yew v. Scow Khee Leng, 1 Malayan L. J. 172 (1989); Lee Kuan Yew
v. Derek Gwyn Davis & Ors, 1 Malayan L. J. 390 (1990); Lee Kuan Yew v. Jeyaretnam JB (No. 1), 1 Sing.
L. Rep. 688 (1990); Lee Kuan Yew v. Chin Vui Khen & Anor, 3 Malayan L. J. 494 (1991); Jeyaretnam
J.B. v. Lee Kuan Yew, 2 Sing. L. Rep. 310 (1992); Lee Kuan Yew v. Devan Nair (Straits Times Press
(1975) Ltd. & Anor, third parties), 1 Sing. L. Rep. 723 (1993); Lee Kuan Yew & Anor v. Vinocur & Ors, 3
Sing. L. Rep. 477 (1995); Lee Kuan Yew v. Tang Liang Hong (No. 1), 2 Sing. L. Rep. 819 (1997); Lee
Kuan Yew v. Tang Liang Hong (No. 2), 2 Sing. L. Rep. 833 (1997); Lee Kuan Yew v. Tang Liang Hong
(No. 3), 2 Sing. L. Rep. 841 (1997); Lee Kuan Yew v. Tang Liang Hong & Anor, 3 Sing. L. Rep. 178
(1997); Tang Liang Hong v. Lee Kuan Yew & Anor, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 97 (1998); Lee Kuan Yew v. Chee
Soon Juan, 3 Sing. L. Rep. 8 (2003); Lee Kuan Yew v. Chee Soon Juan (No. 2), 1 Sing. L. Rep. 552
(2005); Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party & Ors, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 675 (2007); Review Publ’g
Co. v. Lee Hsien Loong, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 52 (2010).
7
Review Publ’g Co. v. Lee Hsien Loong, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 52, 85 (2010).
8
See Walter Woon, Professor of Law at the National University of Singapore, Speech at the
Singapore
Academy
of
Law
(Jan.
3,
2009),
available
at
http://www.sal.org.sg/Lists/Speeches/DispForm.aspx?ID=60.
9
See Chan Sek Keong, Chief Justice of the Republic of Singapore, Speech at the Singapore
Academic of Law (Jan. 3, 2009).
10
Chee Siok Chin v. Minister for Home Affairs, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 582, 626 (2006).
11
Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 675, 702 (2007).
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defamation cases, the opposition Singapore Democratic Party,12 and foreign
publication the Far Eastern Economic Review,13 both dared to make an
association between the government and the NKF scandal. These cases
provide a practical paradigm within which the rule of law in Singapore can
be situated. At the same time, consideration of related contempt of court
proceedings allows for an examination of the government’s claim that the
integrity and independence of the judiciary is under attack.14 Together, these
cases provide a unique insight into the relationship between the courts, the
government, and the rule of law in Singapore. 15
This article suggests that the applicability of any dual state construct
in Singapore, where economic liberalism coexists with political illiberalism,
is inconsistent and has become distorted. Whilst Singapore’s statist
limitation of rights has been justified as necessary to create a stable state and
economic regime, this limitation has now undermined those goals through
increasing uncertainty in Singapore’s common law. In a dual state system, it
is alleged that the rule of law is used not to subvert or restrain the power of
the state, but to reinforce it and provide for an expansion and rationalization
of state power.16 The rule of law is manipulated as a legitimating ideology
to show that the economy is strong because of effective forms of
governance, but at the same time it is abused to silence opposition politicians
and create a system of rule through law.17 The law is thereby bifurcated,18
insofar as commercial law remains depoliticized and paramount to
encourage investment, facilitated through strong legal institutions, yet there

12
Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party & Ors, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 675 (2007), aff’d, Lee
Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 757 (2008).
13
Lee Hsien Loong v. Review Publ’g Co., 1 Sing. L. Rep. 167 (2009), aff’d, Review Publ’g Co. v.
Lee Hsien Loong, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 52 (2010).
14
Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 642 (2009); Att’y-Gen. v. Tan
Liang Joo John & Others, 2 Sing. L. Rep. 1132 (2009); Att’y-Gen. v. Hertzberg Daniel, 1 Sing. L. Rep.
1103 (2009).
15
Even more recent developments involving contempt and criminal defamation proceedings against
Alan Shadrake following the publication of his book, ONCE A JOLLY HANGMAN: SINGAPORE JUSTICE IN
THE DOCK (2010), occurred too late for consideration in this article. Comments made in the book were
held to impugn the impartiality, integrity, and independence of the Singapore judiciary. See Att’y-Gen. v.
Shadrake Alan, S.G.H.C. 339 (2010). Shadrake was sentenced to six weeks’ imprisonment for contempt of
court. Criminal defamation proceedings, which carry imprisonment terms of up to two years, are pending
at the time of publication of this article. Future analysis of the outcome of these cases will undoubtedly be
beneficial for understanding these areas of Singapore law.
16
See Kanishka Jayasuriya, The Rule of Law and Governance in the East Asian State, 1
AUSTRALIAN J. OF ASIAN L. 107, 112 (1999).
17
Id. at 117-8.
18
See Ross Worthington, Between Hermes and Themis: An Empirical Study of the Contemporary
Judiciary in Singapore, 28(4) J. OF L. & SOC’Y 491, 497 (2001).
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is no expansion of rights in the public sphere.19 This article suggests that the
economic ramifications of political decisions, exemplified by the recent
defamation and contempt cases, erodes the foundations of any dual state
construct and creates uncertainty in Singapore’s legal precedent, which
thereby undermines and frustrates the government’s agenda of effective
governance in a strong and stable corruption-free market economy.
This article begins by scrutinizing the concept of the rule of law, and
questions whether a statist and procedural rule of law has emerged in
Singapore. Next, the article examines freedom of speech in Singapore. This
is followed by an analysis of recent defamation cases and contempt of court
proceedings concerning the NKF scandal, and their implications for
opposition politicians and foreign publications in Singapore. The article
concludes that Singapore’s defamation laws are used to chill political
opposition and promote a judicially-accepted narrow framework within
which the rule of law fails to attain sufficiently meritorious value. As this
article terms it, the tropical island state thereby subsists under “the
Singapore Chill,” whereby the risks of legal liability deter Singaporeans and
others from making socially valuable comments and instead persuades them
to maintain their silence.20 This leads to a chilling effect on the freedom of
speech and political opposition in Singapore and has the unintended
consequence of chilling investment stability.21
II.

THE RULE OF LAW IN SINGAPORE

The application of normative and Eurocentric jurisprudential concepts
to places with different legal traditions must be undertaken with caution, and
the rule of law must always be placed in its historical and political context.22
However, Lee Kuan Yew has said that the rule of law in Singapore is “no
cliché,”23 not “an empty slogan,”24 and that Singapore’s reputation for the

19
See Roman Tomasic & Bahrin Kamarul, The Rule of Law and Corporate Insolvency in Six Asian
Legal Systems, 7 CANTERBURY L. REV. 140, 147 (1998-2000).
20
See Andrew Kenyon, Investigating Chilling Effects: News Media and Public Speech in Malaysia,
Singapore and Australia, 4 INT’L J. OF COMM. 440, 442 (2010), for a useful discussion of the concept of
chilling speech.
21
See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
22
See, e.g., PENELOPE NICHOLSON, BORROWING COURT SYSTEMS: THE EXPERIENCE OF SOCIALIST
VIETNAM 11-30 (2007).
23
Lee Kuan Yew, First Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore, Speech at the Opening of the
Singapore Academy of Law (Aug. 31, 1990) (Yew stated, “[i]f the government had failed to establish the
basics for political stability and social cohesion, the rule of law would have become an empty slogan in a
broken-backed Singapore. But we have succeeded, and the rule of law today in Singapore is no cliché.”).
24
Id.
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rule of law “has been and is a valuable economic asset,”25 which is
“[i]mportant for investors and economic growth.”26 Therefore, concerns
about exporting a foreign concept are not central in the Singaporean context.
A.

Substantive versus Procedural

The value of a rule of law depends on the value of law, which itself
depends on how law is conceived. The rule of law in Singapore is seen to
have European origins, which invites an analysis of what that rule
signifies.27 Whilst by no means the only approach to the rule of law, Dicey
enunciated three tenets:28 first, that law has supreme authority and limits the
arbitrary exercise of power;29 second, that all are equally subject to the law;30
and third, that the law is maintained by an independent judiciary which
protects the rights of citizens.31 The liberal origins of Dicey’s tenets
recognize the principle of parliamentary sovereignty in addition to the rule
of law.32 Dicey argued that this parliamentary sovereignty however exists
alongside the authority of judges determining the meaning of the law,33 and
the principle of representative democracy.34 Dicey’s thoughts were premised
on the assumption that all liberal democracies have functioning oppositions.
Whilst from one perspective the Diceyan concept represents a thin rule of
law, insofar as it might allow unjust laws to come into being through an
overly formalistic approach, the presence of a functioning opposition
generally dilutes any such concerns.
However, the assumption that state acts and laws can be tested by an
independent judiciary is not necessarily guaranteed where one party controls
the political scene. Singapore’s judiciary has indicated that it will only test
laws to confirm they have been enacted in accordance with correct
procedure and will remain indifferent as to whether the law was “fair, just
25
See Eugene Kheng-Boon Tan, Law and Values in Governance: The Singapore Way, 30 HONG
KONG L. J. 91, 110 (2000) (citing 65 SINGAPORE PARLIAMENTARY REPORTS, col 236 (Nov. 2, 1995)).
26
Lee Kuan Yew, First Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore, Keynote Address at the
Opening of the International Bar Association Conference (Oct. 14, 2007).
27
HAN FOOK KWANG, WARREN FERNANDEZ, & SUMIKO TAN, LEE KUAN YEW: THE MAN AND HIS
IDEAS 411 (1998) (citing Lee Kuan Yew, First Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore, Speech to the
University of Singapore Law Society (Jan. 18, 1962) (Yew stated, “[t]he rule of law talks of … concepts
which first stemmed from the French Revolution and were later refined in Victorian England.”).
28
ALBERT VENN DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 188-96
(10th ed. 1959). Cf. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
29
DICEY, supra note 28, at 188.
30
Id. at 193.
31
Id. at 195-6.
32
Id. at 39-40.
33
Id. at 407.
34
Id. at 83.
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and reasonable.”35 In following a thin interpretation of a thin rule of law,
where the judiciary is apathetic to the fairness, justness, and reasonableness
of laws imposed by government,36 Singapore’s judiciary might thereby give
deference to the executive in interpreting those laws.
This distinction highlights that there is a need to distinguish between a
procedural, rule-book, and thin rule of law, and a substantive, rights-based,
thick rule of law.37 With the concession that the rule of law is such a
contested concept,38 what the rule of law embodies in Singapore will depend
on which side of politics the inquiry is addressed to. According to Li-Ann
Thio, the PAP favors a thinner rule of law, whereas opposition politicians
desire a thicker and more rights-based rule.39 The government’s rule of law
has been used as a tool to stabilize the country to enable certainty in
investment and commerce.40 The rule of law has been “Singaporeanized”
and is politically inert in an otherwise economically dynamic country where
“economic modernisation [has] occurred sans political liberalisation.”41
Singapore’s rule of law is not focused on democracy, but is rather concerned
to secure stability to entice foreign investment.42 This stability is further
secured through the prioritization of community interests and constructed
Confucianist values.43
On one analysis, Singapore’s judiciary has embraced a form of
communitarian legalism, whereby the rights of the state trump those of the
individual.44 In defamation cases, the courts must determine the balance
between protecting free speech, and protecting the perceived integrity of
35

Jabar bin Kadermastan v. Pub. Prosecutor, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 617, 631B (1995).
Id.
37
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 11 (1985); Paul Craig, Formal and
Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework, PUBLIC L. REV. 476 (1997);
Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 BOSTON U. L. REV. 781, 784-91 (1989). See also
LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF THE LAW (2nd ed. 1969).
38
See, e.g., HLA Hart, Book Review of the Morality of Law, 78 HARVARD L. REV. 1281, 1285-6
(1965).
39
See Thio, supra note 2, at 183-4.
40
See Li-Ann Thio, Lex Rex or Rex Lex? Competing Conceptions of the Rule of Law in Singapore,
20 UCLA PAC. BASIN L. J. 1, 22, 24 (2002).
41
Id. at 25.
42
Id. See also Thio, supra note 2, at 191-3; Lee Kuan Yew, supra note 1, at 73 (Yew stated, “[t]he
history of our financial centre is the story of how we built up credibility as a place of integrity, and
developed the officers with the knowledge and skills to regulate and supervise the banks, security houses,
and other financial institutions so that the risk of systemic failure is minimized.”). Lee Kuan Yew, supra
note 1, at 491 (Yew stated, “Singapore depends on the strength and influence of the family to keep society
orderly and maintain a culture of thrift, hard work, filial piety, and respect for elders and for scholarship
and learning. These values make for a productive people and help economic growth.”).
43
See Thio, supra note 40, at 26.
44
See Eugene Kheng-Boon Tan, “We” v. “I”: Communitarian Legalism in Singapore, 4
AUSTRALIAN J. OF ASIAN L. 1, 11-18 (2002).
36
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Singapore’s leaders. This is more than a “subtle tension” between protecting
the interests of the community at large over constitutional protection to
individuals.45 It is a fundamental tension. The PAP justifies this approach
by the concept of the junzi,46 part and parcel of their emphasis placed on
Asian values,47 and moral legitimacy,48 in order to protect the economic
stability of Singapore. The method of using the rule of law to entice foreign
investment through public order has gained judicial acceptance.49 However,
this method of protecting economic stability is questionable. One perception
is that commercial laws are developed through harmonization and a
universalist approach to ensure commercial certainty and stability,50 whereas
non-commercial laws are applied with this emphasis on communitarian and
essentially relativist values.51
B.

Judicial Normalization of a Statist Rule of Law

The judiciary’s acceptance of the PAP’s framework can be viewed as
implicit approval of the policy of exceptionalism so fundamental to the
PAP’s rule. Rather than focusing on civil-political rights, the focus from
1959 to 1990 was on socio-economic rights.52 According to Lee Kuan Yew,
Singapore has shaken itself free “from the confines of English norms which
did not accord with the customs and values of Singapore society,” as a result
of Singapore’s “traditional Asian value system, which places the interests of
the community over and above that of the individual.”53 Elements of British
colonialism, which emphasized strong executive power to establish the
colony, have remained.54 In the words of Yong Pung How, C.J., the
“sovereignty, integrity and unity of Singapore are undoubtedly the
paramount mandate of the Constitution and anything … which tend[s] to run
45

Cf. id. at 7.
Junzi is a Confucian term referring to the ideal human.
47
See also White Paper on Singapore’s Shared Values (Cmd. 1 of 1991), 8 (stating that, “[t]he
concept of government by honourable men (junzi) who have a duty to do right for the people, and who have
the trust and respect of the population, fits us better than the Western idea that a government should be
given as limited powers as possible, and should always be treated with suspicion unless proven
otherwise.”).
48
Thio, supra note 40, at 27.
49
See, e.g., Yong Pung How, Former Chief Justice of Singapore, Speech at the Legal Service Dinner
(Apr. 6, 2001). See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
50
See Thio, supra note 40, at 29. See also Tan, supra note 25, at 91-92.
51
See Thio, supra note 40, at 29.
52
See Tan, supra note 44, at 11.
53
See Lee Kuan Yew, First Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore, Speech at the Opening of
the Singapore Academy of Law (Aug. 31, 1990), available at 2(2) SING. ACADEMY OF LAW JOURNAL 155,
155 (1990).
54
See Tomasic & Kamarul, supra note 19, at 147. See also Lee Kuan Yew, supra note 23, at 412.
46
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counter to these objectives must be restrained.”55 The judiciary has taken
judicial notice of the community in Singapore, and that political debate and
commentary in many Western liberal democracies is “anathema” to
Singapore’s political system.56
On this approach, the relationship between the judiciary and the
executive then becomes closer and results in acceptance of a thin rule of law
under which the judiciary has normalized, legitimized, and augmented the
PAP’s desired state of affairs.57 This “close and consultative relationship”58
between the executive and the judiciary might better be characterized as a
division of power within the executive, rather than some broader separation
of powers.59 This does not mean that there is direct and deliberate executive
interference with (or consultation on) judicial decision-making. Rather, the
judiciary’s normalization of the executive’s agenda is more subtle and
indirect. This state of affairs is part of a statist regime of legalism: branches
of government are not separated, but divided. Criticisms of this argument,
leveled at the fact that the Singaporean legal system has international
legitimacy,60 ignore the rival fact that this international legitimacy is largely
based on perceptions of commercial certainty and an impressive speed for
processing claims. International concerns are generally not directed towards
the rights of individual Singaporeans, and when they are, they do not see the
judiciary as holding international legitimacy, but as embodying empty
legalism.61
After colonial and then emergency beginnings amidst fears of
communist insurgencies, the power of Singapore’s executive was gained at
the expense of these rights—a regime of exception. Executive power was
removed from criticism and justified in the name of national unity and
public order,62 whilst rudimentary civil and political constitutional rights
55

Chan Hiang Leng Colin & Ors v. Pub. Prosecutor, 3 Sing. L. Rep. 662, 684 (1994).
Tan, supra note 44, at 14.
57
Cf. Lee Kuan Yew v. Vinocur & Ors, 2 Sing. L. Rep. 542, 545 (1996) (concluding that “[a]n
independent and impartial judiciary is a fundamental pillar of our society ….”).
58
See Kanishka Jayasuriya, Corporatism and Judicial Independence within Statist Legal Institutions
in East Asia, in LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA: THE RULE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 170,
181 (Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., 1999).
59
Id. at 182.
60
See, e.g., Tan, supra note 44, at 15.
61
See, e.g., The Decline of the Rule of Law in Malaysia and Singapore Part II—Singapore, A Report
of the Committee on International Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 46
RECORD 5, 17 (1991); INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE REPORT,
PROSPERITY VERSUS INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS? HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN
SINGAPORE (2008), http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=93326691-c4da-473b943a-dd0fc76325e8.
62
See CHRISTOPHER TREMEWAN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOCIAL CONTROL IN SINGAPORE 20406 (1994).
56
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were suspended.63 However, this exception has become the norm, as there
has never been a return to a state of normalcy.64 Executive institutions
remain insulated from any political criticism or scrutiny.65 Using the courts
and the defamation and contempt laws they enforce to silence opposition
through standard civil and criminal proceedings, rather than, for example,
the Internal Security Act (Cap. 143), has normalized this exception.66 The
law itself strengthens political rule, and legitimizes a rule by law, not a rule
of law.67 An emphasis is placed on public order,68 even if this means preempting disruption.69
III.

CHILLING POLITICAL OPPOSITION

A.

Freedom of Speech

Such preemption of disruption is evident in the development of
Singapore’s defamation laws. In shielding the articulation of public critique
of the government, Singapore’s defamation laws are strongly linked to ideas
of Singaporean exceptionalism and the role of law in nation building.
Article 14(1)(a) of the Constitution provides every citizen with the right to
freedom of speech and expression. However, this right is qualified by the
power given to Parliament to impose necessary or expedient restrictions in
the interest of the security and public morality of Singapore, including
restrictions against defamation.70 The interpretation of this qualification,71
and enacted legislation,72 has led to description of the article as “the most
circumscribed in the Constitution.”73 It has even been suggested that these
restrictions have led to Singaporeans being cautious to publicly express non63
See Kanishka Jayasuriya, The Exception Becomes the Norm: Law and Regimes of Exception in
East Asia, 2(1) ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 108, 109 (2001).
64
Id. at 110.
65
Id. at 114.
66
See also FRANCIS T. SEOW, THE MEDIA ENTHRALLED: SINGAPORE REVISITED (1998).
67
See Jayasuriya, supra note 63, at 113.
68
Chan Hiang Leng Colin & Ors v. Pub. Prosecutor, 3 Sing. L. Rep. 662, 688 (1994).
69
Id. See also Li-Ann Thio, The Secular Trumps the Sacred: Constitutional Issues Arising from
Colin Chan v. Pub. Prosecutor, 16 SINGAPORE L. REV. 26, 88 (1995). See also Eugene Kheng-Boon Tan,
Harmony as Ideology, Culture and Control: Alternative Dispute Resolution in Singapore, 9 AUSTRALIAN J.
OF ASIAN L. 120 (2007).
70
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE art. 14(2)(a).
71
See, e.g., Lee Kuan Yew v. J.B. Jeyaretnam, 1 Malayan L. J. 281 (1979); Jeyaretnam J.B. v. Lee
Kuan Yew, 2 Sing. L. Rep. 310 (1992); Lee Kuan Yew & Anor v. Vinocur & Ors, 3 Sing. L. Rep. 477
(1995).
72
See, e.g., Defamation Act, ch. 75 (1965) (Sing.); Penal Code, ch. 224 (1872) (Sing.); Supreme
Court of Judicature Act, ch. 322 (1970) (Sing.) § 8; Official Secrets Act, ch. 213 (1935) (Sing.).
73
See Walter Woon, Singapore, in ASIAN LEGAL SYSTEMS 314, 321 (Poh-Ling Tan ed., 1997).
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official views.74 The judiciary has recognized that the right to freedom of
speech cannot be absolute.75 Much like the circulation of foreign
publications, freedom of speech is seen as a privilege rather than a right.76
By example, police must sanction all public gatherings in Singapore, unless
the event is being held under the auspices of the government.77
In Singapore’s jurisprudence of political defamation,78 there has been
judicial acceptance of executive policy that freedom of speech must end
where individual rights begin; that criticisms of public officials in respect of
their official conduct must respect the bounds set by the law of defamation.79
This approach does not define where individual rights begin, and in this
respect short-circuits the constitutional balancing exercise with which the
courts are entrusted.80 While vehement attacks may be leveled against
public officials, they must not infringe on the right for protection of
reputation.81 As the extent of protection is not defined, it is afforded at the
expense of individual rights. In this way, defamation laws protect the
executive from criticism in a manner that reflects the statist nature of
Singapore’s courts.
Political defamation jurisprudence in Singapore is different from other
common law jurisdictions.
Whereas in many other common law
jurisdictions, any injury caused to reputation is a necessary sacrifice for
politicians, false speech itself does not gain protection under the democratic
rationale.82 Nonetheless, in those jurisdictions, the idea that entering public
74

Id. at 321-22.
See, e.g., Attorney General v. Lingle & Ors, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 696, 701 (1995) (concluding that
allegations made against the judiciary “under the guise of freedom of speech and expression” were held to
undermine public confidence in the administration of justice).
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See James Gomez, Free Speech and Opposition Parties in Singapore, 5 ASIA RTS. J. 1, 3 (2005).
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Public Entertainments and Meetings Act, ch. 257 (1959) (Sing.) § 3.
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See also Tsun Hang Tey, Singapore’s Jurisprudence of Political Defamation and its TripleWhammy Impact on Political Speech, PUBLIC L. REV. 452 (2008).
79
See, e.g., Lee Kuan Yew v. Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin, 1 Malayan L. J. 281 (1979); Jeyaretnam
Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew, 2 Malayan L. J. 282 (1979); Goh Chok Tong v. Jeyaretnam Joshua
Benjamin & Anor, 3 Sing. L. Rep. 337 (1998). See also Michael Hor, The Freedom of Speech and
Defamation: Jeyaratnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew, SINGAPORE J. OF LEGAL STUD. 542 (1992).
80
See Michael Hor & C.S.L. Seah, Selected Issues in the Freedom of Speech and Expression in
Singapore, 12 SINGAPORE L. REV. 296, 312 (1991).
81
Jeyaretnam J.B. v. Lee Kuan Yew, 2 Sing. L. Rep. 310, 332H-I, 333A (1992) (concluding that
“politicians … are equally entitled to have their reputations protected as those of any other persons … the
publication of false and defamatory allegations, even in the absence of actual malice on the part of the
publisher, should [not] be allowed to pass with impunity.”).
82
In England, it has been held to be contrary to public interest for a government body to have
standing in a defamation action because of the importance of government bodies being open to uninhibited
public criticism. See Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1993] A.C. 534 (U.K). A
cogent summary was provided by Lord Bridge of the Privy Council accurately describing the balance of the
position of politicians in English-speaking democracies, including Australia and New Zealand: “In a free
democratic society it is almost too obvious to need stating that those who hold office in government and
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life includes an assumption of risk of public scrutiny prevails.83 For
example, under the public figure doctrine of the United States, a public
official can only recover damages for defamation where the defendant had
actual malice, which is a high threshold to meet.84 Singapore’s courts have
openly rejected the public figure doctrine under U.S. law,85 and instead have
turned the doctrine inside-out by awarding higher damages to public figures,
rather than private citizens, in defamation actions.86 In Singapore, the rights
of those in power are preferred, as persons in public positions of great
responsibility and trust are felt to be more vulnerable. According to Goh
Joon Seng, J., “[t]he greater the reputation of the person defamed, the greater
the damage award that will be made—on the basis that these persons are
vulnerable in so far as they are well known … and have a wider circle of
social and business contacts.”87 On this view, the best people must be
attracted to serve the Singaporean leadership without fear of damage to their
reputations.88
This divergent approach taken by the judiciary to freedom of speech is
similar to other freedoms, such as the right to freedom of religion,89 which
can be circumscribed if its exercise is prejudicial to the common good.90
Singapore’s courts only place selective use upon foreign precedents, and
reject foreign precedents in relation to defenses for defamation. The
“Singaporeanisation” of English defamation laws is consistent with the
judiciary’s general approach to adjudication. After appeals to the Privy
Council were abolished in 1994,91 there has been a surge in developing “a
body of autochthonous case law,”92 which must reflect the fundamental
who are responsible for public administration must always be open to criticism. Any attempt to stifle or
fetter such criticism amounts to political censorship of the most insidious and objectionable kind.” See
Hector v. Att’y-Gen. of Antigua & Barbuda, [1990] 2 All E.R. 103, 106 (U.K). The position in EU law
should also be noted. See Lingens v. Austria, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 407, 419 (1986) (concluding that “[t]he limits
of acceptable criticism are accordingly wider as regards a politician as such than as regards a private
individual. Unlike the latter, the former inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his
every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large, and he must consequently display a greater
degree of tolerance.”).
83
See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 173-4 (1981).
84
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
85
Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 97 (1998).
86
See Tey Tsun Hang, Inducing a Constructive Press in Singapore: Responsibility Over Freedom,
10 AUSTRALIAN J. OF ASIAN L. 202, 217 (2008).
87
Lee Kuan Yew & Anor v. Vinocur & Ors, 3 Sing. L. Rep. 477, 485-6 (1995) (quoting KEITH R.
EVANS, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION IN SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA 104-05 (2d ed. 1993).
88
See also Tan, supra note 25, at 106-8.
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CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE art. 15.
90
Nappalli Peter Williams v. Inst. of Technical Educ., 2 Sing. L. Rep. 569, 576 (1999).
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See also Application of English Law Act, ch. 7A (1993) (Sing.).
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1994 Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent), 2 Sing. L. Rep. 689 (1994) (concluding that “[t]he
development of our law should reflect these changes and the fundamental values of Singapore society.”).
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values of Singaporean society.93 This autochthonous jurisprudence accepts
parliamentary ascendancy and a positivist interpretation of constitutional
provisions,94 to the extent that constitutional interpretation in Singapore is
now to come primarily “from within its own four walls and not in the light
of analogies drawn from other countries such as Great Britain, the United
States of America or Australia.”95 One explanation for this approach is that
there are felt to be “conditions unique to Singapore” such as its “small
geographical size;”96 yet there remains selective acceptance of precedents
from other common law jurisdictions. Whilst this has been felt to imply that
Singapore’s courts have embraced cultural relativism, even if deviating from
common law norms,97 it must be said that this approach augments
uncertainty in Singaporean law. It is by no means clear as to when “unique
conditions” might lead to Singapore’s law diverging from precedents
currently based on broad common law principles.
At present this
divergence is apparent in laws concerning individual rights and freedoms,
including defamation proceedings.
In Singapore, it has been argued that the value of free speech, in
particular for opposition politicians, is limited through the pressure created
by these defamation laws. This is felt to be compounded by an alleged fear
it instills in local media not to disseminate opposition comments.98 Despite
these concerns, Singapore’s judiciary feels there is a need to protect the
government’s reputation and to defend stability and order, even if this means
providing new grounds for executive power.99 In Lee Kuan Yew v.
Vinocur,100 Goh, J. held that an accusation against three ministers of
government of corruption and nepotism “was an attack on the very core of
their political credo [and] would undermine their ability to govern.”101
This development had already included the introduction of the Singapore Law Reports in 1992. It has
continued with the launch of Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore in 1999, and of the Singapore Academy of Law
Annual Review of Singapore Cases in 1999.
93
Id.
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Jabar bin Kadermastan v. Pub. Prosecutor, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 617, 631 (1995).
95
Nappalli Peter Williams v. Inst. of Technical Educ., 2 Sing. L. Rep. 569, 574 (1999). See
generally Li-Ann Thio, Beyond the “Four Walls” in an Age of Transnational Judicial Conversations—
Civil Liberties, Rights Theories, and Constitutional Adjudication in Malaysia and Singapore, 19 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 428 (2005-2006).
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Att’y-Gen. v. Hertzberg Daniel, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 1103, 1125 (2009).
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See Tan, supra note 44, at 7.
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See Gomez, supra note 76. See also INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTITUTE REPORT, PROSPERITY VERSUS INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS? HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, AND THE
RULE
OF
LAW
IN
SINGAPORE
(2008),
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=93326691-c4da-473b-943a-dd0fc76325e8.
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See Jayasuriya, supra note 63, at 115.
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Lee Kuan Yew v. Vinocur, 3 Sing. L. Rep. 491 (1995).
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Singapore’s judiciary feels there is a need to afford protection to the
executive in the hope that it will assist the day-to-day functioning of the
executive. Indeed, Chua, J. elucidated precisely this view in Lee Kuan Yew
v. Seow Khee Leng.102 There, his Honor held that “[m]oral authority is the
cornerstone of effective government. If this moral authority is eroded, the
government cannot function.”103 It is in the context of this statism and
protection afforded to the executive within which Singapore’s courts
operate.
B.

Defamation and Contempt

The government’s use of defamation cases in Singapore might lead to
the perception that their use silences political opposition. Lee Kuan Yew
argues that if he does not launch defamation actions on allegations made
against him, the claims will be seen as true.104 Those who allege his
defamation actions are designed to silence the opposition “do not understand
how readily an allegation of dishonesty or corruption would be believed in a
region where corruption, cronyism, and nepotism are still a plague.”105 Lee
Kuan Yew sees it as his duty to preserve a climate of confidence and
discipline, “without which Singapore will wither away and die.”106 Recent
cases involving the NKF scandal,107 the opposition, and foreign publications
are illustrative of the proposition that this use of defamation suits leads to a
chilling effect on the freedom of speech and political opposition in
Singapore,108 or more figuratively, “the Singapore Chill,” whereby the risks
of legal liability deter Singaporeans and others from making socially
valuable comments and instead maintain their silence.109
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Lee Kuan Yew v. Seow Khee Leng, 1 Malayan L. J. 172 (1989).
Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
104
See HAN, FERNANDEZ, & TAN, supra note 27, at 222 (citing Interview by British Broadcasting
Corporation, Interview with Lee Kuan Yew, First Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore (June 14,
1995)); see also Lee Kuan Yew, supra note 1, at 130.
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Lee Kuan Yew, supra note 1, at 131.
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See Lee Kuan Yew, First Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore, Speech to PAP MPs After
the Anson By-Election Loss (Nov. 17, 1981) in JAMES MINCHIN, NO MAN IS AN ISLAND: A PORTRAIT OF
SINGAPORE’S LEE KUAN YEW 199 (2d ed. 1990).
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See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
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See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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For a useful discussion of the concept of chilling speech, see Andrew Kenyon, Investigating
Chilling Effects: News Media and Public Speech in Malaysia, Singapore and Australia, 4 INT’L J. OF
COMMC’N 440, 442 (2010).
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1.

Opposition Politicians

a)

Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party

VOL. 20 NO. 2

In Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party, Lee Kuan Yew
and Lee Hsien Loong sued the Singapore Democratic Party (“SDP”), its
secretary-general, Dr. Chee Soon Juan, and a member of its Central
Executive Committee, Ms. Chee Siok Chin, for defamation in respect of two
articles and a photograph concerning the NKF scandal published in The New
Democrat, the SDP’s own newspaper. The following words were inter alia
the subject of dispute:110
It is impossible not to notice the striking resemblance between
how the NKF operated and how the PAP runs Singapore …
Singaporeans must note that the NKF is not an aberration of the
PAP system. It is, instead, a product of it. … With the PAP
monopolizing power and making sure that no one has the
means to challenge that hold on power … are we not witnessing
the NKF but on a larger and national scale?
Belinda Ang Saw Ean, J. granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs,
which is possible because the courts of Singapore have assumed jurisdiction
to award summary judgments in defamation cases.111 In this case, her Honor
held that the disputed words and photograph constituted defamation by
implication.112 In congruence with the consistency of the success of Lee
Kuan Yew and Lee Hsien Loong in defamation actions,113 the Court of
Appeal dismissed an appeal against this decision.114
According to Belinda Ang Saw Ean, J. the “sting” in the disputed
words was that they highlighted commonalities between the government and
the NKF, namely, “lack of transparency and lack of accountability,” and
implied “that the PAP and the political elite are not transparent about the
finances of the Government … because they want to conceal their financial
improprieties.”115 They implied that Lee Kuan Yew had set up “a corrupt
political system for the benefit of the political elite … ;”116 that Lee Hsien
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 675, 684-5 (2007).
See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. SM Summit Holdings Ltd., 4 Sing. L. Rep. 529 (1999).
Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 675, 700 (2007).
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 757 (2008).
Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party, 1 Sing. L. Rep. 675, 701 (2007).
Id. at 702.
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Loong had perpetuated this corrupt system,117 and that both men were
dishonest and unfit for office.118 Another “sting” was felt to be that Lee
Hsien Loong and Lee Kuan Yew brought defamation actions “not to
vindicate their reputations but to suppress allegations which were true and
which they knew to be true,” which “has led to a situation where wrongdoings cannot be exposed.”119
The court dismissed all defenses, but in so doing adopted an
overwhelmingly black letter law approach by omitting to pay due regard to
all relevant circumstances. Belinda Ang Saw Ean, J. dismissed the defense
of justification on the basis that the matter was in the public interest for a
lack of particulars;120 similarly, her Honor held that the defense of fair
comment was lacking in particulars and was full of generalizations and
vagueness which were “symptomatic of a sham defence.”121 Despite these
strong words, the judgment did not subject these first two defenses to
lengthy analysis. Finally, her Honor dismissed the defense of qualified
privilege.122 Her Honor mentioned the position in other common law
jurisdictions, but ultimately concluded that these positions were
“inconsistent” with Singapore’s defamation laws;123 in other words, cultural
relativism precluded their application. Belinda Ang Saw Ean, J. encountered
no difficulties whatsoever in finding in favor of the plaintiffs.
The defendants, as members of an opposition political party, argued
they had a duty to publish their views as a matter of public interest.124 This
position is similar to one advanced by Associate Professor Tsun Hang Tey of
the National University of Singapore, who has argued that current
defamation laws in Singapore cause a serious imbalance between society’s
interests in political speech and individual reputation, and are “seriously
discouraging” of criticism of government policies.125 However, Belinda Ang
Saw Ean, J. stated that the defendant’s argument was a “distortion,” and
“[t]he mere fact that a publication relates to ‘political information’ or
‘matters of serious public concern’ does not entail that qualified privilege
therefore attaches to its dissemination to the world at large.”126 Regardless
of her Honor’s intentions, dismissing not unmeritorious defenses in such an
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

Id.
Id.
Id. at 703.
Id. at 704-5.
Id. at 705.
Id. at 705-9.
Id. at 709.
Id. at 705.
Tey, supra note 78, at 461.
Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party, 1 Sing. L. Rep 675, 706 (2007).
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inflexible manner silences criticisms of the government made by opposition
politicians and weakens opposition in Singaporean politics.
Whilst no defense to defamation has ever been successful against a
government politician, it is clear that defenses are available for application
in Singapore courts.127 In Jeyaretnam v. Goh Chok Tong,128 a defense of fair
comment was made out by the Minister for Defense against Singapore’s
iconic opposition figure of the time. Whilst defamatory words imputing
dishonorable conduct or a lack of integrity were proven, the courts held that
a fair-minded person could have honestly arrived at the same conclusion.129
Regardless of whether the conclusion was biased, prejudiced, or grossly
exaggerated, it fell within the limit of fair comment.130 This highlights that
the current state of the law discourages the opposition from commenting on
government policy whilst affording protection to the executive. This state of
affairs is exacerbated by the fact that public protests have been stopped
through public order regulations;131 the circulation of domestic and foreign
newspapers is regulated and has been reduced,132 ensuring PAP control of
print media;133 and fines have been introduced for delivering a political
speech without a permit.134 As Singapore has not ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, these restrictions are easily
enforceable.
b)

Related Contempt Proceedings

Apart from defamation laws, the right of freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed by the Constitution is also subject to the law
127

Workers Party v. Tay Boon Too, Sing. L. Rep. 621 (1972-74).
Jeyaretnam v. Goh Chok Tong, 1 Malayan L. J. 334 (1985), aff’d, Jeyaretnam v. Goh Chok Tong
Sing. L. Rep. 106 (1986), aff’d, Jeyaretnam v. Goh Chok Tong, Sing. L. Rep. 4 (1989).
129
Jeyaretnam v. Goh Chok Tong, 1 Malayan L. J. 334, 340-41 (1985).
130
Id. at 341.
131
This included: an amendment to § 4 of the Societies Act in 1988 to permit deregistration of any
society that made political statement beyond its stated mandate; further, the passing of the Maintenance of
Religious Harmony Act, ch. 167A (1992) (Sing.), which prohibits religious groups from conducting
political activities that are disguised as religious; and amendments to the Films Act, ch. 107 (1981) (Sing.),
to ban political advertising using film-related mechanisms (§ 33). See also the Undesirable Publications
Act, ch. 338 (1967) (Sing.).
132
The Newspapers and Printing Presses Act, ch. 206 (1975) (Sing.) was amended in 1974 to give the
Minister discretionary powers to deem if foreign publications were interfering in Singapore’s domestic
politics. This can be done through the publication of an order in the Gazette, which leads to the restriction
of its circulation (§ 24).
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This culminated in the 1984 merger of The Straits Times group and Singapore News and
Publications Ltd. into Singapore Press Holdings—which is presided over by a former PAP cabinet minister
and has been previously headed by former internal security chiefs S.R. Nathan and Tjung Yuk Min.
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Public Entertainments and Meetings Act, ch. 257 (1959) (Sing.) § 3 (a police permit is required to
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concerning contempt of court.135 The legislature has granted the High Court
and the Court of Appeal the power to punish any individual for contempt of
court,136 which includes any comment which scandalizes the court or
damages the credibility of the judiciary’s independence.137
Whilst
Singapore’s government has stated that it does not intend to inhibit the
interchange of views on matters of public interest, it has made clear that any
deliberate attempt to undermine the authority of the courts “by casting
aspersions on the integrity of the judges in order to further a political or
ideological agenda” will be met with contempt proceedings,138 yet feels that
“[t]his principle is also accepted in other democratic societies”.139 However,
legal precedent in other democratic common law countries is premised on
the assumption that democratic societies have functioning oppositions.
Therefore contempt proceedings instituted in Singapore must be viewed
against this different background.
(1) Singapore Democratic Party
Subsequent to the defamation proceedings, Dr. Chee Soon Juan and
Ms. Chee Siok Chin were also found guilty of contempt of court for their
behavior during the case and sentenced to terms of imprisonment.140
Questions asked and comments made by the defendants in their crossexaminations and oral submissions were felt to constitute “outrageous
behaviour,”141 and “in a small country like Singapore,” felt to undermine
public confidence in the judiciary and impair and bring into disrepute the
administration of justice.142 Belinda Ang Saw Ean, J. felt that, “under the
guise of cross-examination,” the defendants used the hearing “as an occasion
to indict a political regime, publicise their personal and political agenda as
well as stir up political controversy,”143 an objective which perpetuated “the
myth of a defence.”144
Her Honor seemed outraged that the defendants suggested in her
courtroom that in defamation cases involving the government, the PAP “will
interfere with the judicial process so as to procure a favourable verdict,”
135

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SINGAPORE art. 14(2)(a).
Supreme Court of Judicature Act, ch. 322 (1970) (Sing.).
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138
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139
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and/or that the judge will “decide the case in a way that will please or curry
favour with the PAP.”145 These arguments advanced by the defendants
embodied a direct attack on the PAP’s ideological platform, one which the
judiciary strives to uphold.146 Taken as a whole, Belinda Ang Saw Ean, J.’s
comments seemed to suggest that the defendants had broken an unwritten
rule to subordinate themselves as citizens to the deference of their leaders,
and that such a breach would not go unpunished.
For Dr. Chee Soon Juan, this was his second sentence for contempt
imposed in less than two years. In Attorney-General v. Chee Soon Juan,147
Dr. Chee Soon Juan was held in contempt for alleging that the judiciary
acted at the instance of the government in cases involving opposition
politicians, and insinuating that judges were removed from office if they
were perceived as lenient towards opposition politicians.148 This statement
was made at the hearing of a bankruptcy petition against him. In 2001, Dr.
Chee Soon Juan could not find local representation to defend defamation
suits he was facing against Lee Kuan Yew and then Prime Minister Goh
Chok Tong, and was thrice denied permission for representation by a foreign
lawyer.149 Eventually, summary judgment against Dr. Chee Soon Juan was
granted.150 In subsequent bankruptcy proceedings, instituted against him for
failure to pay damages awarded in the summary judgment, Dr. Chee Soon
Juan was again unable to find representation, and a judicial declaration of
bankruptcy blocked his right to contest the 2006 General Election.151 On the
basis of such analogies, it has been argued defamation suits are exploited to
silence and eliminate members of the opposition through the twin swords of
bankruptcy and defamation law.152 In light of the restrictions on political
speeches and protest in Singapore,153 it is not startling that opposition
politicians might attempt to use the sanctum of the courtroom to voice their
145
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political concerns, however it is clear that the judiciary will not provide any
such sanctuary.
(2) Kangaroo Court Allegations
At the hearing for the assessment of damages for Lee Hsien Loong v.
Singapore Democratic Party held in May 2008,154 three men appeared in the
Supreme Court wearing t-shirts each imprinted with a picture of a kangaroo
dressed in a judge’s gown. One of the men pointed to his t-shirt and said
“this is a kangaroo court” to Lee Kuan Yew as he walked past him outside
the court in which the damages hearing was proceeding. All three men were
later found in contempt of court for stigmatizing that the Singapore judiciary
operates in a kangaroo court.155
Judith Prakash, J. found that this “amounted to a deliberate and
provocative attack,”156 which was “intended to cast aspersions on the way in
which the assessment of damages hearing was being conducted,”157 as well
as on the justice system in general.158 All three men were sentenced to terms
of imprisonment. The explicit message conveyed in this case is that the
Singaporean judiciary will not allow itself to be implicated in accusations of
bias. Combined with the use of defamation proceedings, the precedent for
opposition politicians in Singapore is that they must only cautiously express
their public views lest they be found guilty of defamation or contempt of
court.
2.

Foreign Publications

a)

Review Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Lee Hsien Loong

In Review Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Lee Hsien Loong,159 the Far Eastern
Economic Review, a Hong Kong based English language Asian news
magazine, was found to have published an article defamatory of both the
former and current Prime Ministers. The article was largely based on
154

Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party, 1 Sing. L. R. 642 (2009).
Att’y-Gen. v. Tan Liang Joo John & Others, 2 Sing. L. Rep. 1132 (2009). The Attorney-General’s
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Rep. 1132, 1136 (2009).
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criticisms of the government leveled against it by Dr. Chee Soon Juan,
including in respect of the NKF scandal, and comments on the defamation
actions he was facing at the time. Unlike some foreign publications faced
with defamation actions, the Far Eastern Economic Review was not willing
to settle.160 Instead, the Far Eastern Economic Review sought to exert
pressure on the government to allow for greater criticism, and to argue that
Lee Kuan Yew’s use of defamation suits are an impediment to a pluralist and
fully democratic Singapore.161 The following words in the Far Eastern
Economic Review’s article were inter alia the subject of dispute:162
[The NKF corruption scandal] raises the question of whether
Singapore deserves its reputation for squeaky-clean government
… . The government … openly uses the funds for refurbishing
apartment blocks as a bribe for districts that vote for the ruling
party.163 Singaporeans have no way of knowing whether
officials are abusing their trust … Singaporean officials have a
remarkable record of success in winning libel suits against their
critics. The question then is, how many other libel suits have
Singapore’s great and good wrongly won, resulting in the
cover-up of real misdeeds? And are libel suits deliberately used
as a tool to suppress questioning voices?
The defendants stated that these and other words meant that Lee Kuan Yew
has persecuted political opponents under unaltered and antiquated
defamation laws that favor political plaintiffs.164 However, the defendants
denied that these words implicated Lee Hsien Loong in any manner, except
to the extent that they presented him “as a victim of his father’s culture of
non-transparency.”165 In summary judgment, Woo Bih Li, J. found against
the defendants.166 His Honor reiterated that there was no need for a trial to
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take place.167 Both defendants suggested that there ought to be a trial to do
justice to them, because of the stature of the plaintiffs; but his Honor said
that allowing this to occur would place foreign defendants in a more
favorable position than local defendants.168 This is a curious position, given
the positions of power held by the plaintiffs as Prime Minister and Minister
Mentor.
The Court of Appeal upheld the decision at first instance, and found
that the natural and ordinary meaning of these words was that Lee Kuan Yew
and Lee Hsien Loong are corrupt; have been running and continue to run
Singapore in the same corrupt manner as the NKF was run; and have been
using libel actions to cover up their misdeeds.169 To be sure, these
allegations of corruption strike at the heart of Singapore’s ideological
platform as a corruption-free meritocracy with an independent judiciary.
As in Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party,170 the court
rejected all defenses raised, in a manner imbued with black letter law and
insufficient regard to all relevant circumstances, as well as a selective
application of common law precedent. The defense of justification was held
inapplicable, because it was found that the disputed words bore the meaning
pleaded by the plaintiffs, and the defendants had not pleaded justification in
relation to that meaning.171 The defense of fair comment was rejected on the
basis that the defense only applies to comments and not imputations of facts,
and here there were not found to be any supporting facts behind the
allegations of corruption.172 The defense of derivative qualified privilege,
under which the defendants argued that Dr. Chee Soon Juan was entitled to
repel accusations made against him by Lee Hsien Loong and Lee Kuan Yew,
also failed on the grounds that “the law does not allow a free-for-all tit for
tat,” and that a “retaliatory attack” by Dr. Chee Soon Juan on Lee Hsien
Loong and Lee Kuan Yew was “wholly unnecessary” for the purposes of
defending his own reputation.173 This finding was made despite the fact that
Dr. Chee Soon Juan is subject to constant attacks by the most powerful men
in the island state.
The Court of Appeal, in a stunning performance of common law
legitimacy, considered at length the defense of qualified privilege and the
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approach taken in other jurisdictions.174 This spanned frequently considered
jurisdictions such as England,175 Australia,176 New Zealand,177 and
Canada,178 but also included an assortment of other jurisdictions such as
Hong Kong,179 Malaysia,180 Jamaica,181 South Africa,182 Ireland,183 and
Samoa.184 Whilst undertaking any such review might be seen to be
inconsistent with the idea of Singaporeanising common law precedent,185 the
court seemed to suggest that the review of these jurisdictions revealed there
is no such common law precedent in relation to the defense of qualified
privilege. Instead, courts in these jurisdictions have demonstrated there is a
need to decide how to strike an appropriate balance between the
“competing” interests of freedom of speech and protection of reputation in
the context of local conditions.186 The court found that there existed three
approaches to striking this balance.187 First, a “preferential right” approach,
where freedom of speech is preferenced over protection of reputation if it is
reasonable and relates to government and political matters.188 Second, a
“fundamental right” approach, where freedom of speech trumps protection
of reputation, unless the defamatory statement was published with malice.189
Third, a “co-equal rights” approach, where neither freedom of speech nor
protection of reputation takes precedence over the other.190 It is notable that
under none of the three approaches was protection of reputation preferred
over freedom of speech.
However, the court found that, in this instance, because the defendants
were not citizens of Singapore, they were not entitled to enjoy constitutional
free speech, and so there was no need to decide what approach the courts
should adopt to the interpretation of such freedom.191 Nonetheless, the court
174
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outlined in dicta some interesting considerations it thought pertinent in
deciding the limits of constitutional free speech in Singapore.192 The court
suggested that Singapore has no place in its political culture for the making
of “false defamatory statements which damage the reputation of a person
(especially a holder of public office) for the purposes of scoring political
points,”193 because of the “heavy emphasis” placed in Singapore’s culture on
“honesty and integrity in public discourse on matters of public interest.”194
The court felt that it was “one thing to falsely claim that an UFO has been
spotted over the skies of Singapore,” and “quite another to falsely assert that
a person is a crook or a charlatan, especially if that person is also a holder of
public office.”195 This hyperbolized dictum reveals a judicial unwillingness
to change the direction of Singapore’s jurisprudence of political defamation
and instead to maintain the protection afforded to the executive by the
judiciary.
The court ventured to make some astounding comments that there is
no evidence that Singapore’s circumstances have changed significantly since
the founding of the island state, which it will be recalled took place in a
climate of fear and instability. The court held that the balance struck on
September 16, 1963, the day freedom of speech became a constitutional
right in Singapore, between constitutional free speech and protection of
reputation is still “appropriate in the prevailing circumstances in Singapore
today.”196 The court felt that “[p]roponents of change must produce
evidence of a change in [Singapore’s] political, social and cultural values in
order to satisfy the court that change is necessary … .”197 In so stating, the
court demonstrated how the exception truly has become the norm.198 By
implication, the judiciary appears to accept that it has normalized the PAP’s
exceptionalist platform and has no intent of renormalizing the regime of
exception to reflect the position in which Singapore now finds itself in the
21st century. It is doubtful whether defendants would be able to demonstrate
such change has occurred, without mitigating the risk of falling foul of both
the executive and the judiciary.
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(1) Risk of Restriction of Circulation of Publications
Lee Kuan Yew demands that the media operate in Singapore to
reinforce and not to undermine the cultural values and social attitudes of the
government.199 On this view, freedom of the press must be subordinated to
the need to sustain the integrity of Singapore. The government will take
“firm measures” to ensure that unity of purpose in Singapore remains.200
For example, the Media Development Authority of Singapore Act (Cap. 172)
is not merely regulatory in nature; it criminalizes certain acts or
omissions.201 According to Lee Kuan Yew, foreign publications must not
assume a role in Singapore of “invigilator, adversary, and inquisitor of the
administration,” as Singaporean society is not perceived as strong enough to
withstand such treatment.202
Foreign publications require a permit to circulate in Singapore, and
the Minister of Information, Communication and the Arts may give or refuse
approval of the distribution of a foreign publication in Singapore without
assigning any reasons.203 It is seen as a privilege and not a right for this
circulation, and restrictions have been imposed on other large-scale
publications.204 To underline how serious the government is about keeping
the foreign media under check, a ban was imposed on the Far Eastern
Economic Review’s distribution following publication of the article and the
Far Eastern Economic Review’s refusal to comply with new conditions
imposed.205 Thus, there appears to be no commercial certainty (apart from
the PAP line) for foreign media enterprises operating in Singapore, and their
commercial rights to bring foreign capital into the Singaporean economy are
not upheld. Notably, this lack of commercial certainty is also inconsistent
with the government’s economic agenda of encouraging international
investment.
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Related Contempt Proceedings

The judiciary has also shown that it too will take firm measures to
ensure that its decisions are not brought into contempt by foreign media. In
Attorney-General v. Hertzberg Daniel,206 Dow Jones Publishing Company
(Asia) Inc., the proprietor and publisher of the Wall Street Journal Asia, and
sister publication of the Far Eastern Economic Review, was found in
contempt of court. The contempt related to two articles and a letter by Dr.
Chee Soon Juan published in the Wall Street Journal Asia. Their content
largely related to the circumstances considered in both Lee Hsien Loong v.
Singapore Democratic Party and Review Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Lee Hsien
Loong. Dow Jones had already been found guilty of contempt of court on
two previous occasions.207
The court found that all three publications “contained insinuations of
bias, lack of impartiality and lack of independence and implied that the
judiciary is subservient to Mr. Lee and/or the PAP and is a tool for silencing
political dissent.”208 The most recent article was found to imply that the
suppression of political dissent is achieved by way of damages awarded by
the courts in defamation suits; that the judiciary is a tool to muzzle political
dissent and lacks impartiality and independence where opposition politicians
are concerned; and that everything in Singapore, including the judiciary, is
controlled by Lee Kuan Yew.209
Tay Yong Kwang, J. appeared overwhelmingly unimpressed by these
claims. His Honor was especially unenthusiastic with their implications that
“the price of political dissent equals the monetary damages payable in
defamation actions commenced by Mr. Lee and his son,”210 and that judicial
bias towards Lee Kuan Yew and Lee Hsien Loong “assists them in the
suppression of political dissent among opposition politicians” through these
damages.211 The article was found to imply that defamation cases are not
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decided based on their merits, “but for the ulterior purpose of penalising
political dissent.”212
Finally, his Honor was particularly scathing about reference in one
article to a recent report of the International Bar Association. This report,
eponymously entitled “Prosperity Versus Individual Rights,” was damning in
its assessment of defamation actions. The report concluded that Singapore
cannot claim that civil and political rights must be secondary to economic
rights, as the island state now has a highly sophisticated and prosperous
economy,213 and that “the slim likelihood” of a successful defense to
defamation, combined with high damages awarded in cases involving PAP
officials, “sheds doubt on the independence of the judiciary in these
cases.”214 The offending article stated that “when the country is ready to
join the ranks of modern democracies, the IBA’s recommendations provide a
good checklist of how to do so.” 215 In his Honor’s view, this was nothing
short of a “triumphalist note” and a “mocking stance,”216 insidiously
insinuating through the need for reform of the court system that the judiciary
“is not independent and impartial in cases involving the ruling party or its
interests.”217 Notwithstanding these remarks, no charges or proceedings
have been brought against the International Bar Association.
In any event, here the court felt it needed to find contempt because of
the serious nature of the allegations made. The defense of fair criticism
could not succeed in this context, as the offending publications attacked the
impartiality of Singapore’s judiciary and did not contain reasonable
argument or expostulation.218 Most notably, Tay Yong Kwang, J. felt that in
Singapore, “impartiality and independence are the judiciary’s crucial
cornerstones. Putting these qualities into question destabilizes the edifice of
the rule of law and, consequently, threatens to bring down [Singapore’s]
reputation.”219 Therefore the publications could not be countenanced
without punishment for contempt. Damage to the reputation of Singapore
would have ramifications for the executive’s task of nation building, and
would allegedly damage stability and economic growth. The precedent here
is clear: Singapore’s courts will not tolerate press commentary which
212
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undermines the judiciary and, by implication, the executive. Moreover,
when comments destabilize the edifice of the rule of law, creating potential
to erode Singapore’s corruption-free reputation, the courts will defend the
integrity of Singapore with vigor.
c)

Legal Representation

Whilst Singapore’s judiciary may continue to defend Singapore’s
reputation, it appears that some defendants will forego adequate legal
representation in proceedings in Singapore’s courts. Whilst there is not a
lack of counsel who are adequately experienced or trained to litigate an
issue, there is a lack of experienced counsel who are willing to take on
politically-unpopular cases. This is a prime example of the effect of a statist,
thin rule of law on the functioning of Singapore’s legal system. Denying
adequate legal representation both quells dissent and further demonstrates
the hollowness of the government’s cultural relativist claims. In Review
Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Lee Hsien Loong, the Far Eastern Economic Review
experienced denial of its chosen legal representation when the courts refused
to allow representation by a British Queen’s Counsel in the defamation
proceedings.220 The emphasis on communitarian legalism under a statist
conception of the rule of law questions the value of a thin rule of law where
defendants are not able to secure adequate representation. In rejecting the
Far Eastern Economic Review’s appeal against this decision, Tay Yong
Kwang, J. said should FEER’s counsel (alleged to be inadequate and
inexperienced) feel:
he would be embroiled in a battle of ‘David and Goliath’
proportions, perhaps he could take comfort in the fact that the
little shepherd boy armed with only a sling and stones emerged
the victor against the gigantic seasoned soldier wearing a
shield, a sword and a spear.221
This dictum is astonishing on two levels (despite his Honor’s laodicean
characterization of this issue as being “on a lighter note”).222 First, it is
tantamount to an unequivocal recognition by his Honor that Singapore
operates in an unfairly weighted adversarial system. Second, this acceptance
of Singapore’s adversarial system can be contrasted with the emphasis
220
221
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placed on communitarian values by the judiciary, in line with Lee Kuan
Yew’s emphasis on Asian and Confucian values.
Imagery of a stereotypical courtroom battle is not assuaged by any
emphasis on communitarianism, Confucianism, “Asianism” and similar
constructs. As a result of Confucian beliefs, it is said that Singaporeans view
authorities not as adversarial but as an “extension of familiar rule,”223 with a
cultural preference for dispute resolution mechanisms other than
litigation.224 Even under this familiar rule, political reputations and
defamation suits seem “unsusceptible to negotiation.”225 Communitarian
legalism then becomes untenable, because defamation suits are meant to
protect the community from instability in Singapore, but at the same time
they emphasize the cultural norm of adversarialism said to be so foreign to
Singapore. His Honor’s statement either reveals a road-to-Damascus
conversion on the conceptualization of the place of courts in Singaporean
society, or more likely, a miscellany of arguments: cultural norms are only
reverted to when congruent with PAP policy. The value of the rule of law is
lowered when the judiciary, so accepting of the PAP’s politics of exception,
then undermines the cultural values they espouse and, moreover, their
allegedly autochthonous jurisprudence, hitherto seen as so pivotal because of
conditions supposedly unique to Singapore. Finally, the fact remains that
despite Tay Yong Kwang, J.’s reassurances that the litigation might be a
David-and-Goliath battle, in Lee Hsien Loong v. Review Publishing Co. Ltd.,
the “gigantic seasoned soldier” emerged the victor by way of summary
judgment: it will be recalled that no battle took place in the form of a trial.
As a result of this adversarial system, the issue of representation under
the rule of law is brought into question.226 Especially for the Far Eastern
Economic Review, if as according to Tay Yong Kwang, J. the case was going
to be so adversarial, a “slingshot” was never going to be sufficient to create a
watershed in Singapore’s legal history and persuade the judiciary to abandon
its literalist approach to constitutional interpretation. It will also be recalled
that Dr. Chee Soon Juan could not find local representation to defend
defamation suits he was facing from Lee Kuan Yew and then Prime Minister
Goh Chok Tong and was denied permission for representation by a foreign
lawyer.227 It is not surprising that such defendants would encounter
223
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difficulties in finding adequate local representation. The government’s use
of market power, accounting for around 60 percent of the capitalization of
the Singapore Stock Exchange, includes a lot of business for law firms. This
has even been said to encourage lawyers to avoid confrontation with the
government.228 If judicial interpretation of the rule of law in Singapore
means that defendants might forego adequate legal representation, then it
must be questioned as to whether Singapore’s rule of law attains sufficient
meritorious value to be worthy of protection.
IV.

INCREASING UNCERTAINTY IN SINGAPORE’S COMMON LAW

A.

Precedent Set by Recent Cases

Whilst Singapore’s government might hope that the strong message
sent by the judiciary in the recent defamation and contempt decisions will
relax debate on Singapore’s legal system, it is likely that the converse will be
true. This issue of adequate legal representation reminds us in a very real
and confronting manner of the practical implications the court’s decisions
have on Singapore’s rule of law. This issue can be placed in the wider
context of the recent defamation and contempt judgments, themselves so
edifying of the relationship between the courts, the government, and the role
of law in Singapore.
These decisions exemplify how Singapore’s
defamation laws are used to promote a judicially accepted procedural
framework within which the rule of law is weakened.
A subsidiary ground for the defamation actions launched in both Lee
Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party and Review Publishing Co. Ltd.
v. Lee Hsien Loong might have been to justify the plaintiffs’ role in the NKF
scandal, and to avoid damage to the reputation of Singapore, perceived as so
crucial to its economic and political legitimacy. However, another purpose
for the lawsuits may have been that the plaintiffs do not want to risk one of
their key ideological foundations becoming unstuck. If they let the
comments pass without resort to litigation, and Singapore’s economy
continues to thrive, this would cast doubt on the PAP’s rhetoric of
Singapore’s exceptional fragility without one of its key foundational pillars
and, moreover, would open the door to the public articulation of critique.
This would mean that insisting on the importance of a stable economy is
merely a pretext behind the intended purpose of consolidating statist rule.
The precedent set by the two sets of cases is unambiguous: any
comments regarded by Lee Hsien Loong or Lee Kuan Yew as defamatory
228
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will be met with defamation suits in Singapore’s courts, where it is possible
that no trial will take place and summary judgment might be awarded. Any
comments made either outside or within the courts, which question the
independence of Singapore’s judiciary, will be punishable for contempt of
court. Whilst it is undisputed that in any jurisdiction such criticism leveled
at both the executive and the judiciary would not pass without examination,
the approach taken by Singapore’s government to allow criticism to become
increasingly vociferous and to continue the approach of the past four
decades without further reflection can only have a pejorative impact on
perceptions of the nature of Singapore’s common law.
B.

Impact on the Government’s Economic Agenda

The rule of law in Singapore might appear at times to be more a rule
of economics. Singapore’s rule of law might seem to be merely a balancing
exercise between economic prosperity and individual freedom, the balance
leaning towards prioritization of the former. However, the Diceyian rule of
law is exactly that—a rule. It is not to be derogated from. Instead, this rule
of law seeks to support competing rights, without which they would have no
substance. Rights are bare without the rule of law. Lee Kuan Yew’s
acceptance of a thin rule of law, justified by reference to economic
considerations, distorts the “rule” of law. These economic arguments
become a competing policy consideration and diminish the capacity of the
rule of law to provide substance to the rights it seeks to protect.
Moreover, the commercial viability of the current divergent judicial
approach might be untenable in the long-term, insofar as it has the potential
to destabilize Singapore’s common law through creating inherent uncertainty
in all legal precedents. This is in stark contrast to a position advocated by
Yong, C.J. in 2001, when his Honor stated that:
Singapore is a nation which is based wholly on the Rule of Law
… . It is the certainty which an environment based on the Rule
of Law guarantees which gives our people … and other foreign
investors, the confidence to invest in our physical, industrial as
well as social infrastructure.229
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The potential erosion of this confidence would be damaging to Singapore’s
economy and therefore reconsideration by Singapore’s political elite of
issues raised in this article is warranted.
In neither the case of Lee Hsien Loong v. Singapore Democratic Party
nor in the case of Review Publishing Co. Ltd. v. Lee Hsien Loong would
Dicey’s tenets of the rule of law be satisfied. The application of the law is
arbitrary insofar as certain foreign publications are allowed uncircumscribed
circulation, 230 and the executive is given preference over the opposition to
voice its views, which also means the law is not applied equally to those
groups.231 Further, such an arbitrary and unequal application of the law does
not protect the rights of foreign media or opposition politicians to basic
political freedom, and certainly does not protect the rights of Singapore’s
citizens.232 Singapore’s thin and statist rule of law continues to diverge from
the rule of law in other jurisdictions to which Singapore strives to maintain
continuity with precedent in commercial cases. There is a need to recognize
that any balancing exercise between economic prosperity and individual
freedom is at odds with the approach taken in other common law
jurisdictions, where instead economics and individual rights go hand in
hand.
The divergent nature of Singapore’s common law might be of concern
to foreign corporations operating in what to date has been a haven in a
region beset by political instability and corruption. It appears that
companies are willing to openly question the viability of Singapore as an
acceptable forum for the settlement of commercial disputes. In Oakwell
Engineering v. Enernorth Industries,233 an application to enforce a
Singaporean judgment in Ontario was opposed on the basis that there is an
institutional bias in Singapore’s courts and that Singapore’s justice system
was contrary to the Canadian concept of justice. Ontario’s Court of Appeal
upheld the decision at first instance to enforce the judgment.234 At first
instance, Day, J. held that Singapore’s courts “have a reputation for fairness
in deciding cases between private commercial parties.”235 Whilst the
defendant tendered evidence in respect of possible government interference
in trials, Day, J. found that such evidence pertained only to “political cases,”
230
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and that the case under consideration was a “commercial case.”236 Whilst
the defendants provided reports that Singapore’s rule of law does not meet
the standards of the rule of law in Canada, Day, J. held that such evidence
went against the “formal legal structure” of Singapore evidenced in its
constitution and laws.237 Day, J. granted the application for enforcement of
the Singaporean judgment in the absence of evidence that Singapore’s courts
are biased when deciding a commercial case between private parties.238
Both the first instance and appellate judgments show that the
Canadian judiciary was not inclined to enter into scrutinization of
Singapore’s judiciary, perhaps in the interests of comity. That said, Day, J.’s
judgment might be interpolated to reveal that his Honor did agree that
“political cases” in Singapore might not necessarily be judged in an unbiased
manner, by dichotomizing between “political” and “commercial” cases.
However, his Honor did not expand on when cases might fall into either
category, and it might be that such a distinction is not so clear-cut. It is
unclear to what extent the government would need to have an interest in a
company or other legal entity for it to be considered a “political” case. Here,
the dual state construct yet again becomes unstuck. It is blurred as to when
cases in Singapore might be considered political and subject to special
treatment by the judiciary, which creates uncertainty in Singapore’s common
law and undermines the government’s economic agenda.
Oakwell Engineering v. Enernorth Industries is also significant
because it is likely to create a future trend, in which Singapore’s reputation
as a center for commercial legal certainty will be subject to examination by
courts in other jurisdictions. Whilst Singapore’s courts have legitimized
their judgments and certainty provided by the legal system through an
application of common law principles, the increasing divergent attitude
displayed by the judiciary typifies an exceptionalist platform on which many
of Singapore’s policies are formulated. If Singapore’s courts come under
increasing scrutiny, this is likely to erode the foundations of the certainty
provided by common law precedent. Foreign companies would then become
increasingly reluctant to submit to the jurisdiction of Singapore’s courts and
they would be less inclined to include Singaporean jurisdiction and/or choice
of law clauses in their contractual arrangements. Instead, foreign companies
would be likely to opt instead for the selection of fora where there is no
controversy surrounding the state of judicial independence. Again, any such
actions would be inconsistent with the government’s economic agenda of
236
237
238

Id. at 543.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 543.

MARCH 2011

THE SINGAPORE CHILL

351

attracting international investment. The avoidance of Singaporean governing
law clauses would not only harm Singapore’s law firms, but would also
result in international investment being directed towards other jurisdictions.
Moreover, if foreign companies are seeking for their contractual
arrangements to be governed by laws which provide for commercial
certainty, then it is doubtful whether Singaporean law is in a position to
guarantee such certainty. It might be expected that recognition of other
supposed conditions “unique” to Singapore has the potential to lead to rapid
and unanticipated departures from common law precedent.239 Indeed, it
would be a paradoxical—or at the very least perplexing—state of affairs if
the cultural relativist approach adopted by Singapore’s judiciary does not
eventually alter other laws. There is no justifiable explanation as to why
these departures might not occur in other areas of the law, including contract
and company law, and why they instead should be limited to cases
concerning individual rights. Whilst it might be argued that Oakwell
Engineering v. Enernorth Industries shows precisely the opposite, namely
that commercial cases have in fact been successfully separated from political
cases, the judiciary’s cultural relativist approach in relation to individual
rights can only be expected to be considered increasingly anomalous and is
likely to come under increasing levels of international scrutiny.
The dual state construct in Singapore, under which commercial law
remains depoliticized and readily enforceable, has thereby been distorted by
the increasingly statist rule of law. Lee Hsien Loong and Lee Kuan Yew, by
strengthening their rule through a mountain of defamation actions, have
destabilized the government’s economic agenda—the very outcome which
their actions have sought to avoid. Singapore’s common law cannot be
bifurcated because the government’s economic agenda appears to have
become undermined through increasing uncertainty in Singapore’s common
law foundations.
Singapore’s government is no longer in a position to manipulate the
concept of the rule of law to construct the perception of effective forms of
governance in a stable and prosperous market,240 at the same time using
these arguments of effective governance to reinforce illiberal political
practices.241 Commercial law can no longer remain depoliticized to
encourage investment, facilitated through strong legal institutions,242 given
that it has been subjected to increasing levels of international scrutiny. If
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Singapore is to maintain a rule of law, which is respected by others, then the
rule of law can no longer be used as a legitimating ideology to show that the
economy is strong, but at the same time to silence political opposition and
rule through law. 243 Singapore’s rule of law has peaked in its ability to
reinforce and provide for an expansion and rationalization of state power.
Singapore has a unitary system of common law, and it cannot reasonably be
expected that those who have been satisfied to use Singapore law to govern
their commercial transactions will not begin to question where political
influence stops and certainty of common law precedent begins.
V.

CONCLUSION

The recent defamatory and contemptuous allegations of corruption
leveled against both the executive and the judiciary not only struck at the
heart of Singapore’s ideological, corruption-free platform buttressed by
judicial independence, but also brought into question the extent to which the
approach emphasized by both the judiciary and the executive is tenable in
the long-term without eroding the government’s economic agenda. This
article raises confronting questions for those with interests in Singapore’s
legal system. It casts doubt on the extent to which judicial acceptance of the
government’s politics of communitarian legalism will not infiltrate
Singapore’s commercial law. Judicial normalization of a statist rule of law,
of which but one example is the manner in which defamation laws are
applied to chill political opposition, determines that no area of Singapore’s
common law can remain forever depoliticized and readily enforceable, and
that any boundaries between “political” cases and “commercial” cases will
only become ever more distorted and uncertain. This contention has been
reached following consideration of several key issues.
First, Singapore’s use of the rule of law as an economic asset means
that the analysis of the applicability of such a normative and Eurocentric
jurisprudential concept to an Asian legal system is justified. The value of
Singapore’s rule of law depends on how law in Singapore is conceived.
Irrespective of whether a preference for a thick rule of law and an
independent judiciary might be seen as a Western approach, it has been
shown that under Singapore’s cultural relativist approach, the statist,
procedural, thin rule of law is used as a tool to entice economic investment,
without concern as to whether laws on individual rights and freedoms are
fair, just, or reasonable. The judiciary has accepted the PAP’s exceptionalist
platform that Singapore is vulnerable and in so doing affords additional
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protection to the executive at the expense of individual rights. The
relationship between the executive and the judiciary has become so close
that their interaction might be better characterized as a division of power
within the executive, rather than some broader separation of powers.
Second, restrictions on freedom of speech in Singapore discourage the
public from becoming politically active. Defamation laws in Singapore give
greater rights to those in positions of power, which is indicative of
Singapore’s selective judicial application of common law precedent. Under
the Singapore Chill, the risks of legal liability are so substantial that the law
deters Singaporeans and others from criticizing the government and instead
persuades them to maintain their silence.
Third, the recent sets of defamation and contempt cases have
significant implications for the state of Singapore’s legal system. The cases
highlight that neither the executive nor the judiciary will tolerate accusations
of corruption leveled against Singapore’s system of governance. The
precedent for opposition politicians, foreign publications, and anyone
considering accusing the executive of corruption and the judiciary of lacking
independence, is unmistakable: defamation suits and contempt proceedings
will be used to defend the government’s reputation whenever it is brought
into question. Defendants might expect to encounter difficulties in obtaining
adequate legal representation in Singapore’s courts.
Finally, the applicability of any dual state construct in Singapore is an
unsatisfactory explanation for the government’s justification of the adequacy
of Singapore’s legal system. It can never be clear as to where the divide
between political and commercial cases lies, and the determination of the
judiciary to diverge from sound common law precedent based on the
recognition of conditions “unique” to Singapore creates uncertainty in
Singapore’s common law.
This has the potential to frustrate the
government’s economic agenda of effective governance in a strong and
stable corruption-free market economy, as foreign players might become
disinclined to use Singapore law to govern their transactions, or Singapore’s
courts as an appropriate forum for the resolution of their commercial
disputes. Until such time as the Singapore Chill lifts, it should only be
expected that the legitimacy of Singapore’s legal system will be the subject
of progressively more intensive debate, which can only serve to damage the
government’s priority of securing economic prosperity for the future.

